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Abstract. This paper incorporates the interdisciplinary New Institutional and Transaction Costs 
Economics and suggests a holistic framework for analysis of management agro-ecosystem services. 
That new approach for analyses and assessment of management of agro-ecosystem services includes: 
definition of the agro-ecosystem services and the governance; specification of governance needs of 
agro-ecosystem services and the spectrum of available governing modes (formal and informal 
institutions, market, private, public and hybrid forms); assessment of efficiency of different modes of 
governance in terms of their potential to protect diverse eco-rights and investments, assure a socially 
desirable level of agro-ecosystem services, minimize overall costs, coordinate and stimulate eco-
activities, meet individual and social preferences and reconcile conflicts of related agents etc. 
Key words: ecosystem services, mechanisms of governance, environmental management, market, 
private, public and hybrid governance 
Introduction 
The governance and assessment of ecosystem services is among the most topical issues in 
academic, business, and policy debates in recent years [1,2,3,4,5,6]. It is recognized that the 
maintenance and improvement of ecosystem services requires an effective social order 
(governance) and coordinated actions at various levels (individual, organizational, 
community, regional, national, and transnational). 
It is also known that the effective forms of governance are rarely universal and there is a 
huge variation among different ecosystems, regions, countries etc. The efficiency of 
environmental management depends on the specific governing structures which affect in 
dissimilar ways individual’s behavior, gives unlike benefits, commands different costs, and 
leads to diverse actual performances [2,3,7].  
Agro-ecosystems comprise a considerable portion of the ecosystems and they are associated 
with diverse services [8]. Nevertheless, research on the management of this specific 
ecosystem services is still at the beginning stage [9,10,11,12]. 
 Most studies focus on certain hotspots or type agro-ecosystems (e.g. pastoral, crop), and 
individual modes of management (formal, contract, business, public). What is more, 
significant costs associated with the eco-system services management (known as transaction 
costs) are not entirely taken into account. Furthermore, uni-disciplinary approach dominates, 
and efforts of ecologists, economists, lawyers, behavioral and political scientists are rarely 
united. Besides, there are little studies on specific natural, economic, institutional, 
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international etc. factors responsible for the variation among different ecosystems, regions 
and countries.  
This paper incorporates the interdisciplinary New Institutional and Transaction Costs 
Economics [14,15,16,17] and suggests a holistic framework for analysis of management 
agro-ecosystem services.  
That new approach for analyses and assessment of management of agro-ecosystem services 
includes: definition of the agro-ecosystem services and the governance; specification of 
governance needs of agro-ecosystem services and the spectrum of available governing modes 
(formal and informal institutions, market, private, public and hybrid forms); assessment of 
efficiency of different modes of governance in terms of their potential to protect diverse eco-
rights and investments, assure a socially desirable level of agro-ecosystem services, minimize 
overall costs, coordinate and stimulate eco-activities, meet individual and social preferences 
and reconcile conflicts of related agents etc. 
 
1. Agro-ecosystem services and the governance 
Humans benefit from multiple resources, products and processes supplied by natural 
ecosystems known as ecosystem services [6]. They include:  
- provisioning services - food; water; pharmaceuticals, biochemicals, and industrial products; 
energy; genetic resources etc.;  
- regulating services - carbon sequestration and climate regulation; waste decomposition and 
detoxification; purification of water and air; crop pollination;  pest and disease control; 
mitigation of floods and droughts, etc.;  
- supporting services - soil formation; nutrient dispersal and cycling; seed dispersal; primary 
production, etc.;  
- generation and maintenance of biodiversity; 
- cultural services - cultural, intellectual and spiritual inspiration, recreational experiences, 
scientific discovery, etc. 
The agro-ecosystem services comprise ecosystem services provided by the agro-ecosystems. 
The later are commonly defined as spatially and functionally coherent units of agricultural 
activity incorporating the living and nonliving components and their interactions (9, 18). That 
implicitly includes as a key component the agricultural activity such as crop production, 
raising animals, natural resource management (land modification, set aside measures) etc. 
According to their specific characteristics and the goals (and levels) of the analysis, the 
boundaries of individual agro-ecosystem could be a part of a separate farm (e.g. a cultivated 
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parcel, a meadow, a pond), located in numerous farms, or cover a larger region in a country 
or (sub)continent. Moreover, the individual agro-ecosystem could include, be a part, or 
overlap with other ecosystems - dryland, mountain, coastal, urban etc. 
The type and the amount of agro-ecosystem services depends on the natural evolution of 
ecosystems, the progression of farming practices and technologies, the development of social 
demand and preferences etc. (Figure 1). Moreover, the particular value (and priority) that 
individual communities and societies give on diverse agrarian resources, activities, outputs 
and services are quite specific at any moment of time, and depends on socio-economic 
development, endowment with natural resources, culture, progress in science, public 
education and awareness of potential benefits and hazards etc. 
Figure 1: Mechanism of governance of ecosystem services 
 
 
Therefore, in the beginning the analysis is to specify various ecosystem services associated 
with different agro-ecosystems. Modern science offers quite precise methods to classify 
diverse ecosystems and their services (including agro-ecosystems ones), and their spatial and 
temporal scales [6]. For instance, Figure 2 illustrates the spectrum of services of Agro-
ecosystems in Zapadna Stara Planina – a mountainous region in North-West part of Bulgaria. 
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Figure 2: Services of Agro-ecosystems in Zapadna Stara Planina in Bulgaria 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Maintaining a sustainable supply of agro-ecosystem services requires an effective social 
order (governance) regulating behavior and relations of individuals related to ecosystem 
services [8]. The management of agro-ecosystem services does not mean “management of 
services of nature” but management of environment preservation and improvement activities 
of various agents. The later requires a system of coordination and stimulation of eco-activity 
which is to induce appropriate behavior of individuals2 and coordinated actions at local, 
national, and transnational levels. 
According to (awareness, symmetry, strength, harmonization costs of) interests of agents 
associated with agro-ecosystem services (consumers, contributors, transmitters, interest 
groups etc.) there are different needs for management of actions.  
For instance, Farm 1 must govern its efforts and relations with Farm 2 since both receive 
services from Ecosystem 1 and affect (positively or negatively) the service supply of the 
ecosystem (Figure 3). Moreover, both farms are to govern their relations with consumers of 
services from Ecosystem 1 (Social System 1) to meet total demand and compensate costs for 
maintaining ecosystem services in that direction. In addition, Farms 1 and 2 must coordinate 
efforts with Social System 1 to mitigate conflicts with Social System 2. Furthermore, Farm 1 
is to govern its relations with Farm 3 for effective service supply from Ecosystem 3, and 
manage its interaction with Ecosystem 2. Moreover, Farms 1 and 3 have to govern their 
relations with Farm 4 and Social Systems 1 and 2. Finally, Farm 1, affecting adversely 
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Ecosystem 4 services, is to govern relations with agents in Social System 2 to reconcile 
conflicts and secure the effective flow of ecosystem services. Therefore, Farm 1 is to be 
involved in seven different systems of governance in order to assure the effective supply of 
services from ecosystems it belongs to or affects. 
Figure 3: Governance needs for effective supply of agro-ecosystem services 
 
 
 
 
Therefore, the second step of the analysis is to identify the specific management needs for 
each agro-ecosystem service. The later depend on particular characteristics of the ecosystem 
(services, scale, interactions with other eco-systems), and the number and interests of related 
agents.  
Simultaneously trends, factors, problems and risks associated with services of agro-
ecosystems are to be clarified. Modern science offers precise methods to evaluate trends and 
risks in the evolution of various ecosystems, and to identify driving ecological and social 
factors for their progression [6].  
In any case persistence of serious eco-problems and risks is an indicator that an effective 
system of management is not put in place. 
Individuals behavior (actions, restriction of actions) are affected and managed by a number 
of distinct modes and mechanisms of governance including (Figure 1): 
– institutional environment (or “rules of the game”) – that is the distribution and 
evolution of formal and informal rights and obligations between individuals, groups, 
generations, and the system(s) of enforcement of these rights and rules [15, 16]. 
The spectrum of rights could embrace material assets, natural resources, intangibles, certain 
activities, labor safety, clean environment, food security, intra- and inter-generational justice 
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etc. A part of the rights and rules are constituted by the formal laws, regulations, standards, 
court decisions etc. In addition, there are important informal rules and rights determined by 
tradition, culture, religion, ideology, ethical and moral norms. Enforcement of rights and 
rules is done by the state, community pressure, trust, reputation, private modes, and self-
enforcement. 
Institutions and institutional modernization create dissimilar incentives, restrictions and costs 
for maintaining and improving eco-system services, intensifying eco-exchange and 
cooperation, increasing eco-productivity, inducing private and collective eco-initiatives, 
developing new eco and related rights, decreasing eco-divergence between social groups and 
regions, responding to ecological and other challenges etc. For example, (socially, legally) 
acceptable norms for use of labor, plant, livestock, and environmental resources; employment 
of certain forms of contracts or organizations; trade with particular resources and products 
etc., all they could differ even between various regions of the same country3.  
The institutional “development” is initiated by the public (state, community) authority, 
international actions (agreements, assistance, pressure), and the private and collective actions 
of individuals. The later is associated with the modernization and/or redistribution of the 
existing rights; and the evolution of new rights and the emergence of novel (private, public, 
hybrid) institutions for their enforcement.  
In the modern society a great deal of individuals’ activities and relations are regulated and 
sanctioned by some (general, specific) formal and informal institutions. However, there is no 
perfect system of preset outside rules that can govern effectively the entire activities of 
individuals in all possible (and quite specific) circumstances of their life and relations 
associated with diverse ecosystems (services).  
– market modes (“invisible hand of market”) – those are various decentralized 
initiatives governed by free market price movements and market competition – e.g. spotlight 
exchanges, classical contracts, production/trade of organic products, origins etc. 
The importance of free market for the coordination (direction, correction) and stimulation of 
economic activities, exchanges and allocation of resources is among fundamentals of modern 
economics. Individual agents use (adapt to) markets profiting from the specialization and 
mutually beneficial exchange (trade) while their voluntary decentralized actions govern the 
overall distribution of efforts and resources between activities, sectors, regions, eco-systems, 
countries.  
Nevertheless, there are many instances of lack of individual incentives, choices and/or 
unwanted exchanges - e.g. missing markets, monopoly and power relations, positive or 
negative externalities etc. Consequently, free market “fails” to govern effectively the entire 
activity, exchanges, and resources of individuals.  
                                                 
3 In Valonia for instance, the environmental standards are much more restrictive than in other 
two Belgium regions - Flandria and Brussels [19]. 
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– private modes (“private or collective order”) – those are diverse private initiatives and 
special contractual and organizational arrangements – e.g. voluntary actions, codes of 
behavior, eco-contracts, eco-cooperatives etc. 
Individual agents take advantage of economic, market, institutional etc. opportunities and 
deal with institutional and market deficiency by selecting or designing mutually beneficial 
private modes (rules) for governing of their behavior, relations and exchanges. The private 
mode negotiates own rules or accepts existing private (collective) order, transfers existing 
rights or gives new rights to counterpart(s), and safeguards absolute (assigned by the 
dominating institutions) and/or contracted rights.  
In modern society a great part of the agrarian activity is governed by private negotiations, 
“visible hand of the manager”, or collective decision-making. Nevertheless, there are many 
examples of “private sector deficiency and failures” in governing of socially desirable 
activity such as environmental preservation, eco-system services etc.  
– public modes (“public order”) – these are various forms of public (community, 
government, international etc.) intervention in market and private sectors - e.g. public 
guidance, public regulation, public taxation, public assistance, public funding, public 
provision, property right modernization etc. 
The role of public (local, national and transnational) governance has been increasing along 
with the intensification of activity and exchange, and the growing interdependence of social, 
economic and environmental activities.  
In many cases, the effective management of individual behavior and/or organization of 
certain activity through a market mechanism and/or a private negotiation would take a long 
period of time, be very costly, could not reach a socially desirable scale, or be impossible at 
all. Thus a centralized public intervention could achieve the willing state of the system faster, 
cheaper or more efficiently4. Nonetheless, there are a great number of bad public 
involvements (inaction, wrong intervention, over-regulation) leading to significant problems 
of sustainable development around the globe [20]. 
– hybrid forms – some combination of other modes of governance. 
“Governance matters” and depending on the (efficiency of) the system of governance “put 
in place”, the outcome of the development is quite different with diverse levels of socio-
economic progression, environmental conservation and ecosystem services (Figure 1). 
 
 
                                                 
4 At current stage (“globalization”) many of the challenges facing economical and agrarian 
development (food security, eco-management, fight against diseases, climate change,) requite 
trans-border or even global governance. 
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2. Factors for governance choice 
The choice of management mode depends on a number of key factors: 
- personal characteristics of individual agents – preferences, believes, ideology, 
knowledge, capability, training, managerial experience, risk-aversion, bounded rationality, 
tendency for opportunism, reputation, trust, power etc. For instance, “sustainability 
movements” initially developed as a new ideology and later on formally institutionalized in 
programs, norms, legislation etc.  Farming organization is often restricted to a family 
partnership. If farmer is a good manager he will be able to design and control a bigger 
organization managing effectively more internal (labor) and outside (market and contract) 
transactions. When counterparts are family members (or close friends) there is no need for 
complex organization since relations are easily “governed” by the good will and mutual 
interests of parties.  
Furthermore, benefits for agrarian agents could range from monetary or non-monetary 
income; profit; indirect revenue; pleasure of self-employment or family enterprise; 
enjoyment in agricultural activities; desire for involvement in environment, biodiversity, or 
cultural heritage preservation; increased leisure and free time; to other non-economic 
benefits. 
-  formal and informal institutions - often the choice of governing mode is 
(pre)determined by the institutional restrictions as some forms for carrying farming, 
environmental etc. activities could be socially unacceptable or illegal5. For instance, 
corporate and cooperative organization of farming is forbidden in many countries; market 
trade of farmland, natural resources, and some outputs (inputs) is illegitimate, private 
management of natural ecosystems (parks, reserve zones) is not allowed etc.  
What is more, the institutional environment considerably affects the level of governance 
costs and thus the choice of one or another form of organization. For instance, in conditions 
of well-working public system of regulations (quality standards, price guarantees) and laws 
and contract enforcement, a preference is given to spotlight and classical (standard) contracts. 
On the other hand, when rights on major agrarian and natural resources are not defined or not 
well defined, and absolute and contracted right effectively enforced, that lead to domination 
of primitive subsistence farming, informal, personal and over-integrated forms, unsustainable 
organizations, undeveloped and missing markets etc [21]. 
-  natural and technological factors - eco-governance strongly depends on natural 
recourses endowment and the specific features of each eco-system (type, scale, services, 
interactions, risks etc.) as well as on development of technologies and agro-techniques. For 
instance, the governance of water resources would depend on the natural supply of water and 
                                                 
5 When costs associated with illegitimate governance are not high (possibility for disclosure 
low, enforcement and punishment insignificant) while benefits considerable, then the more 
effective modes prevail – large gray (black) sectors of the economy are common around the 
globe. 
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its correspondence (over-supply, shortage) to water demands. Furthermore, it will depend on 
development of water conservation, use and recycle technologies etc. 
In some cases there is only one practically possible form for governance of a particular eco-
activity. For example, in Japanese dispersed paddy agriculture water supply could not have 
been conducted by individual farmers (high interdependency, nonseparability of water use) 
and since earliest period water use organization developed as public projects [22].  
Very often, an effective governance of environmental activities requires a certain scale and 
thus collective actions at local, regional, national or transnational scale [20]. 
Nevertheless, most eco-activity and exchange could be governed through a great variety of 
alterative forms [8]. For instance, a supply of environmental preservation service could be 
governed as: a voluntary activity of a farmer; though private contracts of the farmer with 
interested or affected agents; though an interlinked contract between the farmer and a 
supplier or a processor; though a cooperation (collective action) with other farmers and 
stakeholders; though a (free) market or assisted by a third-party (a certifying and controlling 
agent) trade with special (eco, protected origins, fair-trade) products; though a public contract 
specifying farmer’s obligations and compensation; though a public order (regulation, 
taxation, quota for use of recourses or emissions); within a hierarchical public agency or by a 
hybrid form. 
Different governance modes are alternative but not equally efficient modes for the 
organization of a particular eco-activity. Each of governing modes has distinct advantages 
and disadvantages to protect eco-rights and investment, and coordinate and stimulate socially 
desirable eco-behavior and activities, explore economies of scale and scope, save 
environmental maintenance (enhancement) and governance costs etc. 
For instance, the free market has a big coordination and incentive advantages (“invisible 
hand of market”, “power of competition”), and provides “unlimited” opportunities to benefit 
from specialization and exchange. However, market governance could be associated with a 
high uncertainty, risk, and costs due to low appropriability of some rights (“public good” 
character), price instability, a great possibility for facing an opportunistic behavior, “missing 
market” situation etc.  
The special contract form (“private ordering”) permits a better coordination and 
intensification of activity, and safeguard of agent’s rights and investments. However, it may 
require large costs for specification of contract provisions, adjustments with constant changes 
in conditions, enforcement and disputing of negotiated terms etc.  
The internal (ownership) organization allows a greater flexibility and control on activity 
(direct coordination, adaptation, enforcement, and dispute resolution by a fiat). However, 
extension of the internal mode beyond family and small-partnership boundaries (allowing 
achieving the minimum technological or ecological requirements; exploration of 
technological economies of scale and scope) may command significant costs for 
development (initiation and design, formal registration, restructuring), and for current 
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management (collective decision making, control on coalition members opportunism, 
supervision and motivation of hired labor etc.). 
The separation of ownership from management (cooperative, corporation, public farm/firm) 
gives enormous opportunities for growth in productivity and management efficiency – 
internal division and specialization of labor; achieving ecosystem’s requirements; exploration 
of economies of scale and scope; introduction of innovation; diversification; risk sharing; 
investing in product promotion, brand names, relations with customers, counterparts and 
authorities. However, it could be connected with huge transaction costs for decreasing 
information asymmetry between management and shareholders, decision-making, controlling 
opportunism, adaptation etc. In addition, the cooperative and non-for profit form suffers from 
low capability for internal long-term investment due to non-for-profit goals and non-tradable 
character of shares (so called “horizon problem”). 
Besides proper “production” (technological, agronomic, ecological etc.) costs for maintaining 
and improving eco-system services their management is usually associated with significant 
governance (known as transaction) costs.  The later could be defined as costs for protection, 
contracting and exchange of individual rights or costs for governing relations with other 
agents - individuals, private entities, public authorities. For example, agents related to 
ecosystem services have costs for identification and protection of various (eco, ownership 
etc.) rights; complying with diverse institutional restrictions (norms, standards, rules); 
finding best prices and partners; negotiating conditions of exchange; contract writing and 
registration; enforcing negotiated terms through monitoring, controlling, measuring and 
safeguarding; disputing through a court system or another way; adjusting or termination 
along with evolving conditions of exchange etc6. 
If transaction costs were zero then the mode of management would have no economic 
importance [14, 17]. Individuals would govern their relationships with the same (equal) 
efficiency though free market (adapting to price movements), and private modes of different 
types (contracts, firms), and collective decision making (cooperative, association), and in a 
nationwide hierarchy (a single private or state company). Then ecological requirements and 
technological opportunities for economies of scale and scope (the maximum ecosystem 
services and productivity of resources, “internalization of externalities”) would be easily 
achieved [14]. All information for the effective potential of activity and exchange 
(optimization of resources, meeting various social demands, respecting assigned and 
transferred rights) would be costlessly available to everybody, and individuals would 
costlessly define new rights, and protect their (absolute7 and contracted) rights, and trade 
owned resources (and products) in mutual benefit until exhausting the possibilities for 
increasing productivity and sustainable development. 
However, when transaction costs are significant, then costless assignment, protection, 
negotiation and exchange of rights are not possible. Therefore, the initial allocation of the 
                                                 
6 Transaction costs have two behaviour origin – agents bounded rationality and tendency for 
opportunism [17]. 
7 determined by dominating institutional environment [15]. 
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property rights between individuals is critical for the overall efficiency and sustainability8. 
What is more, when important rights are not well-defined and/or enforced, then the high 
transaction costs could block the efficient use of resources and/or (mutually) beneficial 
exchanges. For instance, if “rights of sustainable environment” are not well defined, 
significant difficulties in effective ecosystem service supply are created - costly disputes 
between polluting and affected agents, disregards of interests of certain groups or generations 
etc. Consequently, the institutional structures for carrying out the agrarian and environmental 
activities become an important factor, which eventually determines the outcome of the 
system (the efficiency) and the type of development (sustainability) [7]. 
The type of the governance becomes crucial since various modes give unequal possibilities 
for participants to coordinate activities, and stimulate an acceptable behavior of others 
(counterparts and dependents), and protect their contracted and absolute rights from 
unwanted expropriation [17]. In the specific economic, market, institutional and natural 
environment, the rational agrarian agents will seek, choose, and/or develop such modes for 
governing their activities and relations with others, which will maximize their benefits and 
minimize their total (production and transacting) costs. Moreover, both (current) costs for 
using individual governance forms and the long-term costs for their development (initiation, 
maintenance, modernization, and liquidation) have to be taken into account [21].  
Eventually, the distribution of overall (agrarian, environmental etc.) activities between 
different farms, organizations, and markets would be determined by the comparative costs for 
using various governing arrangements as the most efficient one(s) will tend to prevail [21]. 
However, a high efficiency and sustainability of the different governing forms (farms, 
business organizations, collective actions, and public forms) does not always mean a high 
efficiency and sustainability of the development. As North and Williamson have proved, the 
history of institutional development is full of examples of “failures” while the (business) 
organization modernization is usually a success story [16, 17]. Furthermore, the high 
sustainability of (inefficient) public forms is a result of the high transaction costs for their 
reformation (political decision-making and bargaining, strong vested interests of powerful 
groups) and/or the “inefficiency by design” making that transformation complicated [17]. 
Therefore, the third step of the analyses is to identify practically possible (existing and other 
feasible) alternatives for governance for the specific conditions of each eco-system and its 
services. The available (alternative) management modes are to be assessed in terms of 
absolute and comparative potential (limits) of protect eco-rights and investments of agents, 
assure socially desirable level of agro-ecosystem services, minimize overall costs, coordinate 
and stimulate eco-activities, reconcile conflicts, recover long-term costs for organizational 
development etc. in the specific economic, institutional and natural environment.  
 
 
                                                 
8 development could be significantly impeded if rights on critical resources or activities are 
not held by the most efficient user – e.g. constant, costly and unsolvable conflicts between 
landlords and tenant-farmers, highly sustainable unproductive monopolies, etc. 
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3. Principle governance matrix 
Comparative analysis is to include the overall (private and public) eco-system related 
production (eco-maintenance, eco-enhancement etc.) and transaction costs associated with 
the individual management forms.  
The assessment of the precise levels of transaction costs in eco-activity is often not possible 
or very expensive [8]. That is why the analysis is to focus on the combination of critical 
dimensions of eco-activity and transaction9 - the factors responsible to the variation of 
transacting costs between alternative governance modes. As Williamson puts it “align 
transactions (which differ in their attributes) with governance structures (which differ in their 
costs and competence) in discriminating (mainly transaction cost economizing) way” [17]. 
Accordingly, depending on the specific characteristics of each activity and transaction, there 
will be different the most effective form of economic organization for that particular activity 
(Figure 4). 
Figure 4: Principle modes for governing of ecosystem services  
Critical dimensions of transactions 
Appropriability 
                                  High Low
Assets Specificity 
          Low           High 
Uncertainty 
       Low       High       Low       High 
Frequency 
 
 
 
Generic modes 
High  Low High  Low High  Low High  Low 
Free market h h
Special contract form h h
Internal organization h h 
Third-party involvement K K 
Public intervention K 
h - the most effective mode; K - necessity for a third party involvement 
 
Eco-activity (transactions) with good appropriability of rights, high certainty, and universal 
character of investments could be effectively managed by free market through spotlight or 
classical contracts. There are widespread market modes for selling pure “ecosystem 
services” (eco-visits, hunting, fishing, harvesting wild plants and animals) or “ecosystem 
services” interlinked with other products and services (e.g. organic, fair-trade, special origins, 
on-farm sale, self-pick, eco-education, eco-tourism, horse-riding, eco-restaurants etc.). 
                                                 
9 “Frequency”, “uncertainty”, and “asset specificity” are identified as critical factors of 
transaction costs by Williamson [17] while “appropriability” added by Bachev and Labonne 
[23]. 
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Transactions with low specificity and high appropriability could be effectively managed 
through a special contract. For example, eco-contracts and cooperative agreements between 
farmers and interested businesses10 or communities are widely used including a payment for 
ecosystem services, and leading to production methods (enhanced pasture management, 
reduce use of agrochemicals, wetland preservation) protecting water from pollution, 
mitigating floods and wild fires etc.  
Transactions with high frequency, big uncertainty, great assets specificity, and high 
appropriability, have to be governed within internal organization. Very often the effective 
scale of specific investment in agro-ecosystem services (minimum required for eco-impact, 
exploring economies of scale and scope) exceeds borders of traditional agrarian 
organizations (family farm, small partnership). If specific capital (knowledge, technology, 
equipment, funding) cannot be effectively organized within a singe organization11, then 
effective external form(s) is to be used – joint ownership, interlinks, cooperative, lobbying 
for public intervention. For instance, environmental cooperatives are very successful in some 
EU countries [24]. Nevertheless, costs for initiation and maintaining collective organization 
for overcoming unilateral dependency are usually great (big number of coalition, different 
interests of members, opportunism of “free-riding” type) and it is unsustainable or does not 
evolve at all.  
 
4. Needs and modes of public intervention 
The next step of analysis is to identify situations of market and private sector deficiency 
(failures) and the needs for public intervention in ecosystem services. 
For instance serious problems arise when condition of assets specificity is combined with 
high uncertainty and low frequency, and when appropriability is low (Figure 4). In all these 
cases, a third part (private agent, NGO, public authority) involvement in transactions is 
necessary (through assistance, arbitration, regulation) in order to make them more efficient or 
possible at all. Emergence and unprecedented development of special origins, organic 
farming and system of fair-trade, are good examples in that respect. There is increasing 
consumer’s demand (price premium) for these products but their supply could not be met 
unless effective trilateral governance (including independent certification and control) is put 
in place. 
Respecting others rights or granting out additional rights could be managed by “good will” 
or charity actions. For instance, a great number of voluntary environmental initiatives 
(“codes of behavior”) have emerged driven by farmers’ preferences for eco-production, 
competition in industries, and responds to public pressure for a sound environmental 
management. However, environmental standards are usually “process-based”, and 
“environmental audit” is not conducted by independent party, which does not guarantee a 
                                                 
10 e.g. drinking water companies in Germany [24], mineral water company Vittel in France [5].  
11 coalition made, minimum scale of operations reached, economy of scale and scope explored. 
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“performance outcome”. In any case, voluntary (charity) initiatives could hardly satisfy the 
entire social demand especially if they require considerable costs.  
Management of most ecosystem services requires large organizations with diversified 
interests of agents (providers, consumers, destructors, interest groups). Emergence of special 
large-members organizations for dealing with low appropriability is slow and expensive, and 
they are not sustainable in long run (“free riding” problem). Therefore, there is a strong need 
for a third-party public (Government, local authority, international assistance) intervention to 
make such eco-activity possible or more effective [8].  
The next step of the analysis is to identify feasible (technically, economically, politically 
possible) modes of public intervention in agro-ecosystem services. Efficiency of different 
modes of public intervention is to be assessed in terms of correspondence to the needs of 
third-party involvement (Figure 4) and the comparative (coordinating, stimulating, costs-
minimization) efficiency to other feasible modes of public intervention (assistance, public-
private partnership, property rights modernization etc.) [8].  
The overall (public and private) implementation and transaction costs are to be taken into 
account. The later would depend on uncertainty, frequency, and necessity for specific 
investment of public involvement (Figure 5).  
Figure 5: Principle modes for effective public intervention in ecosystem services 
Level of Uncertainty, Frequency, and Assets specificity 
Low                                  ←-----------------------------------→                                       High 
   New property 
     rights and   
  enforcements 
    Public  
regulations 
     Public 
   taxation 
    Public 
assistance 
      Public 
      funding 
       Public 
     provision 
 
Generally, the interventions with a low uncertainty and assets specificity would require a 
smaller public organization (more regulatory modes; improvement of the general laws and 
contract enforcement etc.).  
When uncertainty and assets specificity of the transactions increases a special contract mode 
would be necessary – e.g. employment of public contracts for provision of private services, 
public funding (subsidies) of private activities, temporary labor contract for carrying out 
special public programs, leasing out public assets for private management etc.  
And when transactions are characterized with high assets specificity, uncertainty and 
frequency then an internal mode and a bigger public organization would be necessary – e.g. 
permanent public employment contracts, in-house integration of crucial assets in a 
specialized state agency or public company etc.  
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Initially, the existing and emerging problems (difficulties, costs, risks, failures) in the 
organization of market and private transactions have to be specified. The appropriate pubic 
involvement would be to create an environment for: decreasing the uncertainty surrounding 
market and private transactions, and increasing the intensity of exchange, and protecting 
private rights and investments, and making private investments less dependent etc. For 
instance, the State establishes and enforces quality, safety and eco-standards for farm inputs 
and produces, certifies producers and users of natural resources, regulates employment 
relations, transfers water management rights to farms associations, sets up minimum farm-
gate prices etc. All that facilitates and intensifies (market and private) transactions and 
increases efficiency of economic organizations.   
Next, practically possible modes for increasing appropriability of transactions have to be 
considered.  
The low appropriability is often caused by unspecified or badly specified private rights [21]. 
In some cases, the most effective government intervention would be to introduce and enforce 
new private property rights – e.g. rights on natural, biological, and environmental resources; 
rights on issuing eco-bonds and shares; marketing and stock trading of ecosystem services 
protection; tradable quotas for polluting; private rights on intellectual agrarian property and 
origins etc. That would be efficient when the privatization of resources or the introduction 
(and enforcement) of new rights is not associated with significant costs (uncertainty, 
recurrence, and level of specific investment are low). That public intervention effectively 
transfers the organization of transactions into the market and private governance, liberalizes 
market competition and induces private incentives (and investments) in certain activities. For 
instance, tradable permits (quotas) are used to control the overall use of certain resources or 
level of a particular type of pollution. They give flexibility allowing farmers to trade permits 
and meet their own requirements according to their adjustment costs and specific conditions 
of production. That form is efficient when a particular target must be met, and the 
progressive reduction is dictated through permits while trading allows the compliance to be 
achieved at least costs (through a private governance). The later let also a market for 
environmental quality to develop12.  
In other instances, it would be efficient to put in place regulations for trade and utilization of 
resources and products – e.g. standards for labor (safety, social security), product quality, 
environmental performance, animal welfare; norms for using natural resources, introduction 
of foreign species and GM crops, and (water, soil, air, comfort) contamination; a ban on 
application of certain chemicals or technologies; regulations for trading ecosystem service 
protection; foreign trade regimes; mandatory eco-training and licensing of farm operators etc.  
The large body of environmental regulations in developed countries aim changing the 
farmers behavior and restricting the negative impact on environment. It makes producers 
responsible for the environmental effects (externalities) of their products or the management 
of products uses (e.g. waste). This mode is effective when a general improvement of the 
performance is desired but it is not possible to dictate what changes (in activities, 
                                                 
12 Permits can be taken out of market in order to raise the environmental quality above the 
“planned” (by the Government) level. 
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technologies) is appropriate for a wide range of operators and environmental conditions (high 
uncertainty and information asymmetry). When the level of hazard is high, the outcome is 
certain and the control is easy, and no flexibility exists (for timing or the nature of socially 
required result), then the bans or strict limits are the best solution. However, the regulations 
impose uniform standards for all regardless of the costs for compliance (adjustment) and give 
no incentives to over-perform beyond a certain level.  
In other instances, using the incentives and restrictions of the tax system would be the most 
effective form for intervention. Different sorts of tax preferences (exception, breaks, credits) 
are widely used to create favorable conditions for the development of certain (sub)sectors 
and regions, forms of agrarian organization, segment of population, or specific types of 
activities. The environmental taxation on emissions or products (inputs or outputs of 
production) is also applied to reduce the use of harmful substances. The later impose the 
same conditions for all farmers using a particular input and give signals to take into account 
the “environmental costs” inflicted on the rest of society. Taxing is effective when there is a 
close link between the activity and the environmental impact, and when there is no 
immediate need to control the pollution or to meet the targets for reduction. However, an 
appropriate level of the charge is required to stimulate a desirable change in farmers 
behavior. Furthermore, some emissions vary according to the conditions of application and 
attempting to reflect this in tax may result in complexity and high administrating costs.  
In some cases, a public assistance and support to private organizations is the best mode for 
intervention. Large agrarian and rural support and development programs have been widely 
used in all industrialized countries. They let a “proportional” development of agriculture and 
improvement of farmers welfare (“income parity”).  
The public financial support for the environmental actions is the most commonly used 
instrument for the improving environment performance of farmers. It is easy to find a 
justification for the public payments as a compensation for the provision of an 
“environmental service” by farmers. However, the share of farms covered by various agri-
environmental support schemes is not significant. That is a result of the voluntary (self-
selection) character of this mode which does not attract farmers with the highest environment 
enhancement costs (most intensive and damaging environment producers). In some cases, the 
low-rate of farmers’ compliance with the environmental contracts is a serious problem. The 
later cannot be solved by augmented administrative control (enormous enforcement costs) or 
introducing bigger penalty (politically and juridical intolerable measure).  
A disadvantage of “the payment system” is that once introduced it is practically difficult 
(“politically unacceptable”) to be stopped when goals are achieved or there are funding 
difficulties. Moreover, an withdraw of the subsidies may lead to further environmental harm 
since it would induce the adverse actions such as intensification and return to the 
conventional farming. The main critics of the subsidies are associated with their “distortion 
effect”, the negative impact on “entry-exit decisions” from polluting industry, the unfair 
advantages to certain sectors in the country or industries in other countries, not considering 
the total costs (transportation and environmental costs, and “displacement effect” in other 
countries). It is estimated that the agri-environmental payments are efficient in maintaining 
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the current level of environmental capital but less successful in enhancing the environmental 
quality.  
Often providing public information, recommendations, training and education to farmers, 
other agrarian and rural agents, and consumers are the most efficient form. In some cases, a 
pure public organization (in-house production, public provision) will be the most effective as 
in the case of as in case of important agro-ecosystems and national parks; agrarian research, 
education and extension; agro-meteorological forecasts; border sanitary and veterinary 
control etc. 
Usually, the specific modes are effective if they are applied alone with other modes of public 
intervention. The necessity of combined intervention (a governance mix) is caused by: the 
complementarities (joint effect) of the individual forms; the restricted potential of some less 
expensive forms to achieve a certain (but not the entire) level of the socially preferred 
outcome; the possibility to get an extra benefits (e.g. “cross-compliance” requirement for 
participation in public support programs); the particularity of the problems to be tackled; the 
specific critical dimensions of the governed activity; the uncertainty (little knowledge, 
experience) associated with the likely impact of the new forms; the practical capability of 
Government to organize (administrative potential to control, implement) and fund (direct 
budget resources and/or international assistance) different modes; and not least important the 
dominating (right, left) policy doctrine [20].  
Besides, the level of an effective public intervention (governance) depends on the kind of the 
problem and the scale of intervention. There are public involvements which are to be 
executed at local (ecosystem, community, regional) level, while others require nationwide 
governance. And finally, there are activities, which are to be initiated and coordinated at 
international (regional, European, worldwide) level due to the strong necessity for trans-
border actions (needs for a cooperation in natural resources and environment management, 
for exploration of economies of scale/scale, for prevention of ecosystem disturbances, for 
governing of spill-overs) or consistent (national, local) government failures. Very frequently 
the effective governance of many problems (risks) requires multilevel governance with a 
system of combined actions at various levels involving diverse range of actors and 
geographical scales. 
The public (regulatory, inspecting, provision etc.) modes must have built special mechanisms 
for increasing the competency (decrease bounded rationality and powerlessness) of the 
bureaucrats, beneficiaries, interests groups and public at large as well as restricting the 
possible opportunism (opportunity for cheating, interlinking, abuse of power, corruption) of 
the public officers and other stakeholders. That could be made by training, introducing new 
assessment and communication technologies, increasing transparency (e.g. independent 
assessment and audit), and involving experts, beneficiaries, and interests groups in the 
management of public modes at all levels. Furthermore, applying “market like” mechanisms 
(competition, auctions) in the public projects design, selection and implementation would 
significantly increase the incentives and decrease the overall costs.  
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Principally, a pure public organization should be used as a last resort when all other modes 
do not work effectively [17]. The “in-house” public organization has higher (direct and 
indirect) costs for setting up, running, controlling, reorganization, and liquidation. What is 
more, unlike the market and private forms there is not an automatic mechanism (such as 
competition) for sorting out the less effective modes13. Here a public “decision making” is 
required which is associated with high costs and time, and it is often influenced by the strong 
private interests (the power of lobbying groups, policy makers and their associates, employed 
bureaucrats) rather than the efficiency.  What is more, widespread “inefficiency by design” 
of public modes is practiced to secure (rent-taking) positions of certain interest groups, 
stakeholders, bureaucrats etc. [17]. Along with the development of general institutional 
environment (“The Rule of Law”, transparency) and the measurement, communication etc. 
technologies, the efficiency of pro-market modes (regulation, information, recommendation) 
and contract forms would get bigger advantages over the internal less flexible public 
arrangements.  
Usually hybrid modes (public-private partnership) are much more efficient than the pure 
public forms given the coordination, incentives, and control advantages. In majority of cases, 
the involvement of farmers, farmers organizations and other beneficiaries increases 
efficiency - decreases asymmetry of information, restricts opportunisms, increases incentives 
for private costs-sharing, reduces management costs etc. [21]. For instance, a hybrid mode 
would be appropriate for carrying out the supply of preservation and improvement of 
environment, biodiversity, landscape, historical and cultural heritages. That is determined by 
the farmers information superiority, the strong interlinks of that activity with the traditional 
food production (economy of scope), the high assets specificity to the farm (farmers 
competence, high cite-specificity of investments to the farm and land), and the spatial 
interdependency (needs for cooperation of farmers at a regional or wider scale), and not less 
important – the farm’s origin of negative externalities. Furthermore, the enforcement of most 
labor, animal welfare, biodiversity etc. standards is often very difficult or impossible at all. In 
all these cases, stimulating and supporting (assisting, training, funding) the private voluntary 
actions are much more effective then the mandatory public modes in terms of incentive, 
coordination, enforcement, and disputing costs.   
Anyway, if there is a strong need for a third-party public involvement but an effective 
(government, local authority, international assistance etc.) intervention is not introduced in a 
due time, the agrarian “development” would be substantially deformed [21]. Thus the public 
(Government) failure is also possible and often prevails. In Bulgaria, there have been a great 
number of bad examples for public under- and over-interventions in agrarian sector during 
post-communist transition now [20]. Consequently, a primitive and uncompetitive small-
scale farming; predominance of over-integrated and personalized exchanges; ineffective and 
corrupted agrarian bureaucracy; blocking out all class of agrarian transactions (innovation 
and extension supply, long-term credit supply, supply of infrastructure and environmental 
goods); and development of a large informal (gray) sector, all they have come out as a result. 
                                                 
13 It is not rare to see highly inefficient but still “sustainable“ public organizations around the 
world. 
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Suggested analysis let us define efficiency and potential of divers mechanisms and modes of 
management (institutions, market, private, public) to deal with diverse problems and risks for 
sustainable flow of agro-ecosystem services. Moreover, it let us improve the design of the 
new forms of public intervention according to the specific market, institutional and natural 
environment of a particular eco-system region, sub-sector, country,14 and in terms of 
perfection of the coordination, adaptation, information, stimulation, restriction of 
opportunism, controlling (in short – minimization of transaction costs) of participating actors 
(decision-makers, implementers, beneficiaries, other stakeholders).  
What is more, that analysis unable us to predict likely cases of new public (local, national, 
international ec.) failures due to impossibility to mobilize sufficient political support and 
necessary resources and/or ineffective implementation of otherwise “good” policies in the 
specific economic and institutional environment of a particular country, region, sub-sector 
etc. Since the public failure is a feasible option its timely detection permits foreseeing the 
persistence or rising of certain problems in agrarian development, and informing (local, 
international) community about associated risks.    
 
Conclusion  
We have demonstrated that the suggested new framework let us better understand, assess and 
improve the governance of agro-ecosystem services in the specific market, institutional and 
natural environment of individual ecosystems, regions, countries etc. 
Application of that new approach would have a significant academic as well as practical 
importance. First, it would provide a new framework for analyzing and assessing divers agro-
ecosystem services. Next, it would give new tools for assisting the design of individuals, 
business, and collective actions and organizations, and for improving public policies and 
forms of public intervention in agro-ecosystem services. Finally, it would give new devices 
for making more realistic prediction about likely prospects of ago-ecosystem services 
development in the specific conditions of different eco-systems, regions, and countries. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
14 The effective institutions can not be “imported“ but must be designed for the specific 
conditions of different countries, regions, sectors etc. [16]. 
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